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INTRODUCTION
The canon of trusts and estates, that is, “the ways of thinking
about [trusts and estates] law that are widely shared by legal scholars
and especially by legal authorities, like legislators and judges,”1
*
Associate Dean for Research and Faculty Development and Harold H.
Greene Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law. Thanks to
Carla Spivack for her support, to June Carbone and Bridget Crawford for their
comments, and to Olivia Soloperto and Christine Kumar for research assistance. Some
of the ideas explored in this piece have been developed through work with June
Carbone, Nancy Levit, and Amy Ziettlow. I am grateful to the Wisconsin Law Review
for making this symposium—and my keynote—possible.
1.
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canons of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825,
825 (2004); see also JILL E. HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 2–3, 11 (2014)
[hereinafter FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED]; J. M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons
of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 968 (1998) (defining a canon as a
discipline’s “underlying assumptions, its current concerns and anxieties”). Hasday
analyzes family law’s canons as “deeply rooted, widely held ways of thinking about
family law and its guiding principles that gain strength from their repeated invocation.”
FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED, supra, at 221. These canons center on “a series of
overriding stories that purport to make sense of how the law governs family members
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consists of several different and well-known strands: respect for dead
hand (or transferor) control (up to certain limits); respect for formality;
and valuation of the traditional legally-recognized family.2 Perhaps the
most fundamental—and, paradoxically, the most visible and invisible—
strand is the “wealth” narrative, which focuses on the transmission of
conventional forms of wealth.3 It is this final strand that I believe
structures the rest of the field.
The wealth narrative is the core of trusts and estates.4 Whatever
other stories we tell about trusts and estates, whatever challenges we
make to the existing strands, concern wealth. While this may seem
obvious—another term for the field is “wealth transmission,” after all—
its explanatory power for other canonical stories and for what is left out
of those stories is foundational and, in some surprising ways,
unacknowledged and unaccounted for.5 When we address wealth
transmission, we focus on wealth itself, on those who have wealth and
their practices, and our guiding assumptions are based on our
observations and assumptions about them.
Consider, for example, just why dead hand control is important.
Qe respect the dead hand not because we revere the dead, but because
the decedent earned, or at least safeguarded, their wealth. Formality is
critical to protecting the dead hand’s control over wealth and family is,
in some ways, yet another form of wealth (consider that fathers were
entitled to the earnings from their children’s labor).6 Our critiques of
these principles similarly focus on wealth. Much of the race critique
addresses the inheritance of race and problematizes race itself as a form
of property. Furthermore, for much of our history, wealth has been
concentrated in white married men. Historically, married women were
legally limited in property ownership, and blacks could be considered
property.7 That wealth structure profoundly affected—and affects—
and family life.” Id. at 2. As examples of “canonical narratives,” she notes the focus
on the legal institutions of marriage and parenthood, and argues that such a focus
“overlook[s] and offer[s] little protection to other family ties.” Id. at 5.
2.
See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical
Study of How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325,
326 (2015); see also RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER
OF THE AMERICAN DEAD 6–7 (2010); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates:
Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 656 (2014).
3.
See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 326–27.
4.
See id.; see also Cary Franklin, The New Class Blindness, 128 YALE L.J.
2 (2018) (discussing how substantive due process provides at least some forms of classbased protections).
5.
See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 327.
6.
See Jillian Benbow, Under My Roof: Parents’ Rights to Children’s
Earnings, 16 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 71, 71 n.1 (2005).
7.
See, e.g., Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property
Acts, 6 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 9 (1994); Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race
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trusts and estates legislation, practice, and scholarship. Our scholarship
powerfully analyzes who is left out of receiving wealth, but we still
focus on wealth.
The wealth strand is, accordingly, highly visible, because so much
of trusts and estates law is focused on wealth preservation and control,
and influential, because its pervasiveness overshadows critical aspects
of trusts and estates law. It has also largely been invisible because it
serves as a subtle limitation on analyzing issues outside of the process
of facilitating wealth transmission. Examining this wealth strand shows
how it distorts the field,8 so I want to explore just what asking the
wealth question,9 or using a wealth lens, would actually mean.
Wealth transmission is effectuated, and enforced, through the laws
of trusts and estates. Ownership of wealth is a legal matter, but
unpacking its influence requires delving into economics and sociology:
first, analyzing how wealth transmission also transmits privilege and
maintenance of the status quo; second, looking at who has wealth; and
third, how recognition of the sociodemographic diversity in ownership
of wealth might affect the laws of the trusts and estates field in a variety
of ways, ranging from wealth redistribution10 to changing the structure
of intestate.
To be sure, our scholarly attention is on how trusts and estates
policies reinforce some forms of subordination. More profoundly,
and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1999); Mitchell F. Crusto,
Blackness as Property Rights: Sex, Race, Status, and Wealth, 1 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L.
51, 52 (2005).
8.
Cf., Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 14
(2018) (noting the need to address wealth concentration and family law). As discussed
infra, other trusts and estates scholars also apply the wealth lens.
9.
Katharine Bartlett famously formulated the “Woman Question”:
(1) identifying and challenging those elements of existing legal doctrine that
leave out or disadvantage women and members of other excluded groups
(asking the “woman question”); (2) reasoning from an ideal in which legal
resolutions are pragmatic responses to concrete dilemmas rather than static
choices between opposing, often mismatched perspectives (feminist
practical reasoning); and (3) seeking insights and enhanced perspectives
through collaborative or interactive engagements with others based upon
personal experience and narrative (consciousness-raising).
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 831 (1990).
As Part II discusses, this question can be adapted to ask how our analysis of any
doctrine affects people of varying socioeconomic levels; the opportunity to use doctrine
to address the actual needs and preferences, rather than presumed or supposed ideals;
and the need to draw on alternative perspectives and experiences.
10.
As Felix Chang observes, the “laws governing the transmission of wealth
are poorly suited to tackle inequality.” Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation
and Transmission of Wealth, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 78 (2018). Nonetheless, as he also
notes, a draconian estate and gift tax system would have significant effects on
inequality. Id. at 85–86 (focusing not on gender issues, although mentioning race). See
infra notes 117118 for further discussion of tax and inequality.
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however, my argument relies on the observation that the use and
transmission of wealth reinforces inequality.11 Ensuring that women can
serve as executors of estates,12 for example, is a victory for gender
equality, but directs our focus away from what happens to estates that
never appear in probate court and, more fundamentally, from questions
of what constitutes wealth and the use of wealth to perpetuate economic
and gender inequality.
I want to use this Article to step back and reflect on how new
perspectives from gender, race, class, and sexual orientation have
challenged existing trusts and estates canonical narratives on a number
of different levels,13 both in terms of deepening trusts and estates but
also expanding it—that is, challenging core concepts of the field. But I
also want to urge us to show how what we do as trusts and estates
lawyers is related to economic inequality.
Part I celebrates how new perspectives have challenged the core
trusts and estates canonical narratives, and builds on the significant
analysis of these new perspectives by Bridget Crawford and Anthony
Infanti.14 As this Article shows, these new perspectives challenge basic
concepts of wealth and do the following: 1) bring in alternative
conceptions of wealth and of inheritance; 2) question the biases of
inheritance law as they reflect conventional social norms; and 3)
contextualize the whole field so that it encompasses elder law, history,
sociology, socioeconomics, and other areas.
These new perspectives make a difference by causing us to
question the intestacy regime,15 for example, or by broadening access to
wills.16 And these challenges are brought both by those of us who

11.
See THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 378
(Arthur Goldhammer trans.) (2014) (“[W]ealth originating in the past automatically
grows more rapidly . . . than wealth stemming from work . . . . [T]his tends to give
lasting disproportionate importance to inequalities created in the past, and therefore to
inheritance.”).
12.
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971) (holding that unequal
treatment on the basis of sex in selecting estate administrators violated the Equal
Protection Clause).
13.
For a foundational article on these issues, see Bridget J. Crawford &
Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317 (2014).
14.
Id.
15.
See, e.g., Mary Louise Fellows, Rita J. Simon & William Rau, Public
Attitudes About Property Distribution at Death and Intestate Succession in the United
States, 1978 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 319; Mary Louise Fellows, E. Gary Spitko &
Charles Q. Strohm, An Empirical Assessment of the Potential for Will Substitutes to
Improve State Intestacy Statutes, 85 IND. L.J. 409 (2010); Adam J. Hirsch, Inheritance
on the Fringes of Marriage, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 235, 239–40.
16.
See Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt
Out of Intestacy, 53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 880–81 (2012).
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identify with the new critical trusts and estates scholarship17 and also by
people outside of this movement, perhaps because they have been
influenced by us, perhaps because of the embedded questions inherent
in a focus on transferring wealth.
The second Part turns to the structure of wealth and its
intergenerational transmission, drawing on sociological and
demographic data to show just who is wealthy and how wealth
transmission perpetuates inequality, Finally, based on asking the wealth
question,18 I suggest future directions that might lead to reexamination
of some of the core tenets of trusts and estates: for example, wills may
not be appropriate for everyone, and class differences in families show
the need to include (or be more deliberate in excluding) alternative
families.
Ultimately, for trusts and estates scholarship to call attention to
wealth inequality it must broaden its critique. This includes
conventional trusts and estates topics, such as calls for improved access
to estate planning and higher estate taxes.19 But it might also mean
advocating for greater equality during lifetime, such as through analysis
of a minimum income guarantee.20 While this may seem far afield from
conventional trusts and estates topics—and it is—income inequality
affects trusts and estates practice by defining the core issues and by
determining the identity of our clients. At the end, I want to show how
this brings us to a new understanding of inheritance.
I. CELEBRATION
I begin with a brief celebration of where we are today. My text is
not cases, but our own scholarship, as applied to the core canonical
stories of trusts and estates law that I identified earlier. A critical trusts
and estates jurisprudence has shown how these stories—definitions of
property, formalism and dead hand control, and family recognition—

17.
See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 318 (“[C]ritical scholarship
uses an ‘outsider’ perspective as a lens to examine the substance and structure of the
law . . . [by] examining why the law has developed in the way it has and considering
what impact the law has on historically disempowered groups . . . .”).
18.
See supra note 9.
19.
See, e.g., Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13. at 342–47.
20.
See ALISSA QUART, SQUEEZED: WHY OUR FAMILIES CAN’T AFFORD
AMERICA 240–45 (2018); see also Rosalind Dixon & Julie Suk, Liberal
Constitutionalism and Economic Inequality, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 369, 375 (2018)
(noting that “many constitutional democracies . . . are actively considering, and
passing, measures to increase investments in education and training, raise the minimum
wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income”). See generally ANNIE LOWREY, GIVE
PEOPLE MONEY: HOW A UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME WOULD END POVERTY,
REVOLUTIONIZE WORK, AND REMAKE THE WORLD (2018).
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reflect and reinforce social norms based on race, gender, sexual
orientation, and class.
A. Definitions of Property
As critical jurisprudential trusts and estates scholars have shown,
the bundle of sticks21 that constitutes property can be parsed, based on
race, gender, and other categories.22 First, consider that white heirs
were able to challenge wills that freed slaves, successfully arguing, for
example, that “enslaved blacks were legally classified as immovable
property” and so could not be emancipated.23 On the other hand,
Barack Obama describes how his mother saw being black as being “the
beneficiary of a great inheritance.”24
Next, consider limitations on property based on citizenship.
Property ownership has historically been tied to citizenship status, and
courts in the nineteenth century might prevent noncitizens from
inheriting through intestacy, regardless of whether they were closer in
relationship to the decedent.25 Even today, approximately one-half of
states impose restrictions on noncitizens’ property ownership rights in
some way.26 This affects not just the ownership rights of noncitizens,
but also those of citizens, whose land alienability is restricted.27
21.
“Ownership is a bundle of rights, such as the right to exclude others from
the property, the right to use the property, the right to sell the property, and so forth.”
Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 747, 829 (2015); see Bela
August Walker, Privilege as Property, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 47, 54 (2013)
(stating that property is a “social category”). The sticks generally constitute: “(a) the
right of disposition . . .; (b) the right of possession . . .; (c) the right of control . . .;
(d) the right of enjoyment . . .; and lastly, (e) the right of exclusion . . . .” Id.
22.
See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707,
1758, 1787–89 (1993); Kevin Noble Maillard, The Color of Testamentary Freedom, 62
SMU L. REV. 1783, 1786 (2009) (“[M]y research shows that white collateral heirs, as
both a first and last resort, have leveraged whiteness to contest wills that consciously
excluded them.”).
23.
Crusto, supra note 7, at 106–07.
24.
BARACK OBAMA, DREAMS FROM MY FATHER: A STORY OF RACE AND
INHERITANCE 51 (1995).
25.
See Polly J. Price, Alien Land Restrictions in the American Common
Law: Exploring the Relative Autonomy Paradigm, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 152, 155–56
(1999) (discussing Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 24 (1870), in which distant relatives of a
deceased landholder successfully challenged the right of closer relatives to inherit on
the ground the more immediate heirs were not citizens); Rose Cuison Villazor,
Rediscovering Oyama v. California: At the Intersection of Property, Race, and
Citizenship, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 979, 1017 (2010) (discussing citizenship status-based
restrictions on inheritance).
26.
Allison Brownell Tirres, Property Outliers: Non-Citizens, Property Rights
and State Power, 27 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 77, 97 (2012).
27.
Id. at 128. Elsewhere Tirres has argued that “property law [has been
used] as a tool of immigration regulation.” Allison Brownell Tirres, Ownership Without
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Fourth, until the mid-nineteenth century, women lost rights to
property upon marriage.28 Even after states enacted Married Women’s
Property Acts, distinctions remained between free and enslaved women
(until the Civil War),29 and between married women and men.
Finally, the value of property varies. The decedent’s “dress
clothes”30 might fetch little at resale, but could be invaluable to the
heirs.
***
These examples challenge the seemingly neutral concept of
property.
B. Dead Hand Control and Formalism
The testator’s intent is most respected when it accords with
dominant notions of inheritance; and rights to testamentary freedom
depend on social policy.31 Although dead hand control is celebrated and
the right to control is a form of property, as shown above, the
restrictions on who can inherit show the limitations on dead hand
control. After the Civil War, anti-miscegenation statutes continued to
ensure that blacks could not inherit from white spouses,32 and even
attempts by white male partners to leave property to children born into
their relationship with a black female partner were treated with
suspicion.33

Citizenship: The Creation of Noncitizen Property Rights, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 4
(2013).
28.
See infra Part II.
29.
See, e.g., Bernie D. Jones, Southern Free Women of Color in the
Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New Women’s Legal History,” 41 AKRON L.
REV. 763, 774–75 (2008) (“[S]lave women were denied the legal status that white
women had through marriage.”).
30.
AMY ZIETTLOW & NAOMI CAHN, HOMEWARD BOUND 5 (2017). Clothes
might also be important for burial. Id. at 112 (discussing mother’s burial in “a real nice
Alabama shirt and some jogging pants”).
31.
See Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance,
Reciprocity, and Relational Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 571, 585 (1999); Carla
Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should Be Abolished, 58
U. KAN. L. REV. 245, 308 (2010); Maillard, supra note 22, at 1788.
32.
Maillard, supra note 22, at 1792–93 (“Without the protective status that
marriage conferred, courts viewed interracial families as inherently illegitimate, which
opened estates to the rapacious strategies of white collateral heirs. The reliability of
anti-miscegenist amnesia—that is, the narrative that the interracial family does not
legally exist—fueled the redirection of testamentary intent.”).
33.
See, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at, 280.
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Both husbands and wives were limited by dower and curtesy, until
the doctrines’ abolition.34 Until the Married Women’s Property Acts,
testators were restricted in what they could bequeath to married women
for the women’s own use,35 and married women faced restrictions
themselves on their testation rights.36
In 1981, Jeffrey Sherman argued “that the lover-legatee of a
homosexual testator faces a more difficult task at probate than does his
heterosexual counterpart.”37 Undue influence has been an oft-used
means to challenge wills in favor of same-sex partners38 and has also
been used to challenge other bequests deemed unconventional.39
Moreover, dead hand control may reflect, and thus perpetuate,
societal discrimination. While charitable bequests can no longer
discriminate on the basis of race, some religions may disfavor
women,40 some estate planning practices (such as the QTIP) may also
disadvantage women.41
34.
See, e.g., Damaris Rosich-Schwartz, Tenancy by the Entirety: The
Traditional Version of the Tenancy Is the Best Alternative for Married Couples,
Common Law Marriages, and Same-Sex Partnerships, 84 N.D. L. REV. 23, 36 (2008).
Moreover, “informal restrictions confined single women’s ability” to own property.
Laura M. Padilla, Gendered Shades of Property: A Status Check on Gender, Race &
Property, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 361, 362 (2002). See generally Carla Spivack,
Law, Land, Identity: The Case of Lady Anne Clifford, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 393, 403
(2012) (discussing common law limitations on inheritance of property by females);
Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the
Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 165 (2014) (same).
35.
See, e.g., Shammas, supra note 7, at 11.
36.
See Alfred L. Brophy & Douglas Thie, Land, Slaves, and Bonds: Trust
and Probate in the Pre-Civil War Shenandoah Valley, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 345, 361–
62 (2016) (“[M]arried women in Virginia during the period studied here had limited
rights to dispose of property at death. This . . . helps explain why property was left to
daughters in a legal life estate or in an equitable life estate. Thus, when the daughters
passed away they had no property interest, and the property went immediately to their
issue.”) (citation omitted).
37.
Jeffrey G. Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42
U. PITT. L. REV. 225, 246 (1981).
38.
See, e.g., Camille M. Quinn & Shawna S. Baker, Essential Estate
Planning for the Constitutionally Unrecognized Families in Oklahoma: Same-Sex
Couples, 40 TULSA L. REV. 479, 501–06 (2005); see E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not
Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator from Majoritarian Cultural Norms
Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 275, 278–86, 294–
314 (1999).
39.
See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 330–31 (examining gender
stereotypes embedded in the doctrine of undue influence).
40.
See, e.g., Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Religiously Inspired Gender-Bias
Disinheritance—What’s Law Got to Do with It? 43 CREIGHTON L. REV. 669 (2010);
Shelly Kreiczer-Levy & Meital Pinto, Property and Belongingness: Rethinking GenderBased Disinheritance, 21 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 148–49 (2011).
41.
See Karen J. Sneddon, Not Your Mother’s Will: Gender, Language, and
Wills, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 1535, 1573–74 (2015) (“Due to life expectancies, QTIPs are
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Even critiques of dead hand control show a wealth bias. As
Bridget Crawford points out, some of these analyses suggest that
current generations will be better able to manage the wealth they have
inherited without restrictions, reflecting a belief in a meritocracy that
“ironically allows us to ignore wealth differences.”42
Dead hand control is implemented by respect for the formality
attendant to wills. A will expresses not just the testator’s wishes, but
also commands. Women tend to use precatory language more than men,
so a formal written document (which eschews precatory language) may
be more likely to translate language into the more directive language
that men tend to use.43 Indeed, as Karen Sneddon observes, “initial
reactions to precatory language and expressive language are tinged with
dismissal of ‘non-technical language’ as ‘mere fluff.’”44
More fundamentally, while wills do not require lawyers, being
able to develop an error-free will that is appropriately channeled
depends on the testator’s “characteristics, external resources, and [legal
and] social environment.”45 Yet, one study comparing holographic and
nonholographic wills found that holographic wills, while more likely to
include drafting errors, were no more likely to be challenged.46 This
raises questions of just how much protection formality provides for
testamentary intent as opposed to the other factors that might lead
disappointed heirs to challenge a will.

more frequently created for female spouses with the ultimate disposition of the trust
property then being directed by the deceased male spouse.”). For further commentary
on QTIPS and gender bias, see Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP
Provision, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 97, 97–99 (2000); Wendy C. Gerzog, The
Marital Deduction QTIP Provisions: Illogical and Degrading to Women, 5 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 301, 306 (1995). See also Susan M. Chesler & Karen J. Sneddon, Tales
from a Form Book: Stock Stories and Transactional Documents, 78 MONT. L. REV.
237, 274 (2017) (discussing stock characters in wills).
42.
Personal communication, April 2, 2019.
43.
See Alyssa A. DiRusso, He Says, She Asks: Gender, Language, and the
Law of Precatory Words in Wills, 22 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 46–47 (2007); Sneddon,
supra note 41, at 1551 (“[T]he language of the law itself is male. The ability to shape
language ‘depends, among other things, on one’s apparent legitimacy to engage in that
activity.’ Those who ‘engaged’ in the making of the law and the practice of the law
before the nineteenth century were exclusively men.”) (citations omitted). Kevin
Maillard writes about the “legal power of whiteness” with respect to inheritance.
Maillard, supra note 22, at 1787–88.
44.
Sneddon, supra note 41, at 1567.
45.
Alexander A. Boni-Saenz, Distributive Justice and Donative Intent, 65
UCLA L. REV. 324, 338 (2018).
46.
Stephen Clowney, In Their Own Hand: An Analysis of Holographic Wills
and Homemade Willmaking, 43 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 27, 59 (2008).
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C. Definitions of Family

One of the core concepts in the trusts and estates canon is
inheritance through the bloodline. Using a race lens shows us that
doctrines are not what they appear to be, and this is intertwined with
the previous discussion of definitions of wealth—slave children
inherited their status from their mothers, so, upon birth, became
property—but also involves the interconnected claims of race and
legitimacy that characterized the initial challenges to the inheritance of
nonmarital children.47 Similarly, LGBTQ legal jurisprudence has
questioned the primacy of the bloodline.48 Just a few examples follow.
Consider the questions of whether nonmarital children can inherit
from their fathers. In the initial state court proceedings that evolved
into a “landmark” Supreme Court case involving such rights,49 the
“lawyers made race as well as sex discrimination arguments when
challenging Illinois’s inheritance laws in state court, but apparently
dropped the race-based disparate impact arguments on appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court.”50 The very question of whether nonmarital
children could inherit from their fathers undermines the primacy of the
canonical bloodline.51

47.
Maillard, supra note 22, at 1815–16. Maillard states that:
[T]he larger legal system supports testamentary larceny in blatant
contradiction to explicit legal language recognizing, promoting, and
memorializing intimate connections between black and white. Testamentary
freedom, in all of its aspirational claims, means nothing in the face of a
legal system rooted in the restrictive and damaging conformity of
‘legitimate’ families.
Id. at 1816.
48.
See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 336–38.
49.
Paula A. Monopoli, Toward Equality: Nonmarital Children and the
Uniform Probate Code, 45 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 995, 999 (2012).
50.
Serena Mayeri, Intersectionality and the Constitution of Family Status, 32
CONST. COMMENT. 377, 390 (2017). In Trimble, the Supreme Court struck down parts
of Illinois’s probate code that allowed nonmarital children to inherit through intestacy
from their mothers, but not their fathers, as a violation of equal protection where the
classification was based on legitimacy. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
The lower court noted that: “In support of the position that the statutory framework is
racially discriminatory, petitioner in cause No. 47092 sets forth various statistical
sources which she says indicate that an excessively disproportionate share of
illegitimate children were born to blacks and other minorities as compared to
Caucasians.” In re Estate of Karas, 329 N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ill. 1975).
51.
See Linda Kelly Hill, Equal Protection Misapplied: The Politics of
Gender and Legitimacy and the Denial of Inheritance, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 129, 147 (2006) (discussing the concept of “filius nullius,” under which an
“illegitimate child was the child and heir of no one”).
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While these challenges were designed to recognize bloodlines,
critical trusts and estates jurisprudence has also challenged the
heteronormativity of family definitions.52
***
Taken together, these critiques challenge core canons, such as
dead hand control and the primacy of the bloodline.
II. CHALLENGE: HOW WEALTH STRUCTURES TRUSTS AND ESTATES
But there is still more to be done as we deepen our critique, and
that involves consistently applying a class lens and going beyond
traditional trusts and estates topics. Trusts and estates law, scholarship,
and practice have generally focused on the wealthy.53 That is the
population who can pay the bills of estate planning attorneys and who
are most likely to write wills;54 much of our scholarship focuses on
studying the wealth-transmitting population, mistakes made by their
attorneys, how better to effectuate the intent of that population, to
whom they leave—and do not leave—property, etc. Of course, even
that population is “heterogeneous, and many middle-class individuals
make arrangements for property after their deaths, even if that property
is more modest—for example, a small family home or a collection of
heirlooms.”55 But more than half of the population does not write
wills,56 most low-income Americans have no money saved for
retirement,57 approximately 40% of Americans do not have life
insurance,58 and almost two-thirds have not planned for incapacity.59
52.
See Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 335–37 (documenting the work
of E. Gary Spitko, Tom Gallanis, and Mary Louise Fellows, among others).
53.
See Boni-Saenz, supra note 45, at 329.
54.
Older white people with a graduate degree are the most likely to have
wills. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, GALLUP (May 18,
2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx
[https://perma.cc/U5VC-CHM5].
55.
Boni-Saenz, supra note 45, at 329; see David Horton, Intestacy, Wills,
and Intent: A Short Comment on Wright & Sterner, 43 ACTEC L.J. 339, 342 (2018)
(noting heterogeneity of wills).
56.
Nick DiUlio, More Than Half of American Adults Don’t Have a Will,
2017 Survey Shows, CARING.COM, https://www.caring.com/articles/wills-survey-2017
[https://perma.cc/7A9K-XRBT]; Jones, supra note 54.
57.
See Monique Morrissey, The State of American Retirement, ECON. POL’Y
INST. (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.epi.org/publication/retirement-in-america/#charts
[https://perma.cc/2JLR-33N6] (“In 2013, nearly nine in [ten] families in the top income
fifth had retirement account savings, compared with fewer than one in [ten] families in
the bottom income fifth.”).
58.
New Study Reveals More than 40 Percent of Americans Don’t Have Any
Form of Life Insurance, MKT. WATCH (Sept. 4, 2018 10:00 AM),
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We use the preferences of those who die with wills to make
recommendations for those who die intestate and whose property passes
outside of probate courts.60 Indeed, further study of how inheritance
happens outside of probate court is needed,61 and there is a need for
more scholarship on non-financial issues, such as the guardianship of
children,62 at death or incapacity.
As this Part shows, wealth functions in trusts and estates at
different levels. A first issue, discussed above, is just what constitutes
wealth. Second is looking at how wealth is distributed and who is thus
more likely to engage in estate planning. Third is the relationship
between wealth transmission and economic inequality. This Section
turns first to address the socioeconomics of wealth, that is, who has
wealth, and then turns to the deeper structure of wealth in our society,
how having wealth reinforces economic inequality. It then shows the
impact of wealth on intergenerational mobility, and finally, how asset
transmission contributes to intergenerational wealth inequality. The
final part concludes by using this analysis to argue for the need for
greater self-consciousness and acknowledgement of the potential for
bias that results from relying on the preferences of those people who
leave records.
A. Structure of Wealth
The conventional definition of wealth is financial and we live at a
time of increasing economic inequality, in which wealth accumulation
is increasingly concentrated in a smaller percentage of the population

https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/new-study-reveals-more-than-40-percentof-americans-dont-have-any-form-of-life-insurance-2018-09-04
[https://perma.cc/MYW7-RWTN]; Peter R. Orszag, The Decline of Life Insurance Is a
(Feb.
27,
2018,
4:30AM
CST),
Mystery,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-02-27/the-decline-of-life-insuranceis-a-mystery (“The share of Americans with life insurance has fallen to less than 60
percent, from 77 percent in 1989.”).
59.
Carolyn Crist, Over One Third of U.S. Adults Have Advanced Medical
Directives, REUTERS (July 11, 2017 5:11 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/ushealth-usa-advance-directives/over-one-third-of-u-s-adults-have-advanced-medicaldirectives-idUSKBN19W2NO [https://perma.cc/C99F-4YXB].
60.
See infra note 116.
61.
Studying these issues is, of course, difficult. For some of this work, see
Mary Louise Fellows, supra note 15 (intestacy), Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2;
DiRusso, supra note 43, and Hirsch, supra note 15.
62.
Cf. Deirdre M. Smith, Keeping It in the Family: Minor Guardianship as
Private Child Protection, 18 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. (forthcoming) (draft at 6–7),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3349167 (noting the lack of
scholarship relating to minor guardianships as used in child protection proceedings).
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that depends less on wages and more on investment income.63 Thus,
assets that are inherited are critically important in maintaining and
building wealth. The term “wealth” refers to any assets, ranging from
bank accounts to stocks to real property; it is thus different from
income, which, until it becomes wealth, is transitory and is an ongoing
flow (that, obviously, stops at death).64 Both wealth and income provide
measures of economic status and inequality65 (although wealth
preservation is the focus of many trusts and estates practitioners).
Some of the wealth structure statistics are straightforward, and
they document the gap between wealthy and non-wealthy families. In
1978, the 0.1% richest families owned 7% of the country’s wealth; by
2012, that had grown to 22%.66 Taking a broader measure of wealth
families, the median upper-income family (those who make more than
$127,600) now holds 75 times the wealth of the median low-income
family (those who make less than $42,500); in 2007, top earners were
worth 40 times as much; and in 1989, the multiple was 28.67 The
bottom half, based on household income, of the American population
owned about 1.2% of total wealth, while the top 1% of households
owned more than 38% of the wealth.68

63.
See Nelson D. Schwartz, The Recovery Threw the Middle-Class Under a
Benz,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
12,
2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/12/business/middle-class-financial-crisis.html
[https://perma.cc/FQ32-GSMQ] (“[T]he proportion of family income from wages has
dropped from nearly 70[%] to just under 61[%].”).
64.
See Aloni, supra note 8, at 7–9 (2018) (defining wealth and income, and
noting that wealth is capable of transfer and sale); Angela Hanks, Danyelle Solomon &
Christian E. Weller, Systematic Inequality: How America’s Structural Racism Helped
Create the Black-White Wealth Gap, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Feb. 21, 2018 9:03
AM),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2018/02/21/447051/systematicinequality/ [https://perma.cc/X83A-CFJ3].
65.
See Drew DeSilver, The Many Ways to Measure Economic Inequality,
PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 22, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/09/22/the-many-ways-to-measure-economic-inequality/
[https://perma.cc/UB4X-7LEW] (discussing income, consumption, and household
wealth and noting “[m]ost researchers agree that wealth is more unevenly distributed
than income, while consumption is less concentrated at the upper end than either wealth
or income”).
66.
EMMANUEL SAEZ & GABRIEL ZUCMAN, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. ,
WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1913: EVIDENCE FROM CAPITALIZED
INCOME
TAX
DATA
1
(2014),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w20625.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MTT-ETSC].
67.
Lydia DePillis, America’s Wealth Gap is Bigger than Ever, CNN BUS.
(Nov. 3, 2017, 4:09 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2017/11/03/news/economy/wealthgap-america/index.html [https://perma.cc/98ZS-QR47].
68.
Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA (July 2018),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/
[https://perma.cc/E7SF-5JW9].
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At the same time, turning to income, there is a growing earnings
gap between the college and non-college educated.69 And the gap in
weekly wages between the top and bottom is increasing.70 By 2016, the
average CEO pay at top companies was 361 times as high as median
worker income; in the late 1950s, it was approximately 20 times.71
Yet these overall statistics mask significant differences by race,
ethnicity, gender, marital status, and age.
1. RACE
Income and wealth vary by race and between races.72 Consider that
Asians earn more than any other group, and yet their income inequality
is also higher than any other group.73
When it comes to wealth distribution, “blacks between 50 and 65
years old and near retirement had only about 10% of the wealth of
whites in the same age group.”74 Indeed, “African Americans have
fewer assets than whites and are less likely to be homeowners, to own

69.
THE RISING COST OF NOT GOING TO COLLEGE, PEW CTR. (2014),
http://www.pew.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2014/02/SDT-higher-ed-FINAL-02-112014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAA6-H3K7].
70.
Naomi Cahn, June Carbone & Nancy Levit, Gender and the Tournament:
Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in an Age of Inequality, 96 TEX. L. REV. 425, 455
(2018); see also Drew DeSilver, For Most U.S. Workers, Real Wages Have Barely
Budged in Decades, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 7, 2018), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/10/09/for-most-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-for-decades/
[https://perma.cc/QW44-CBRW].
71.
Diana Hembree, CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times that of the Average
(May
22,
2018,
04:28pm),
Worker,
FORBES
https://www.forbes.com/sites/dianahembree/2018/05/22/ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361times-that-of-the-average-worker/#173128fe776d [https://perma.cc/U4PU-MSNV]; see
Benjamin F. Mitchell, Report: CEO Pay More Than 300 Times Average Workers in
TODAY
(June
21,
2015,
7:02PM),
2014,
USA
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2015/06/21/epi-report-ceo-pay-303-timesaverage-2014/29000333/ [https://perma.cc/BPW7-RM4X]. As with other sectors, the
disparities between top firms and others often exacerbate differences in compensation.
See Executive Paywatch: High-Paid CEOs and the Low-Wage Economy, AFL-CIO,
http://www.aflcio.org/Corporate-Watch/Paywatch-2014
[https://perma.cc/4WS2NCF6].
See Anthony Cilluffo & Rakesh Kochhar, How Wealth Inequality Has
72.
Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race, Ethnicity and Income, PEW
RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/11/01/howwealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-by-race-ethnicityand-income/ [https://perma.cc/7R3N-FZVN].
73.
Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, Key Findings on the Rise in Income
Inequality Within America’s Racial and Ethnic Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 12, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/07/12/key-findings-on-the-rise-in-incomeinequality-within-americas-racial-and-ethnic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/J5DH-L98W].
74.
Hanks et al., supra note 66.
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their own business, and to have a retirement account.”75 Moreover,
even when these types of assets were owned by blacks, their value was
still much lower than comparable assets owned by whites.76 Blacks and
Hispanics were significantly less likely than whites to have savings
outside of a retirement account to provide them funds when they retired
and were somewhat less likely to have Social Security.77
2. AGE
The poverty rate for older people is comparatively low, at about
8%, although a larger number are economically insecure, and, in line
with the rest of the population, their rates are not increasing, but their
numbers are growing.78 Moreover, overall poverty rates for older
people mask the differences based on marital status, race, gender, and
other factors. Indeed, the National Institute on Retirement Security
reported that women who are sixty-five and older have incomes that are
25% lower than men’s of the same age, and that the women are 80%
more likely than men to be impoverished.79
The general poverty rate for older Americans who are living alone
(or with nonrelatives) is 18%.80 Married women who are 65 and older
have a low poverty rate (2%), particularly compared to the poverty
rates for widowed (13%), divorced (16%), and never-married women
(18%).81 Turning to those specifically affected by grey divorce, women

75.
Id.
76.
See id.
77.
Report on the Economic Well-Being of U.S. Households in 2017 – May
2018, FED. RESEARCH BD., https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/2018economic-well-being-of-us-households-in-2017-retirement.htm
[https://perma.cc/QA3X-Z79H].
78.
See
Poverty
Rate
by
Age,
KAISER
FAMILY
FOUND.,
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-byage/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort
%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/7PRL-SENN].
79.
Women 80% More Likely to Be Impoverished in Retirement, NAT’L INST.
ON RET. SEC. (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.nirsonline.org/2016/03/women-80-morelikely-to-be-impoverished-in-retirement/ [https://perma.cc/9JQF-LTGC].
80.
Ashley Edwards et al., Outlying Older Americans: The Puzzle of
Increasing Poverty Among Those 65 and Older, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: CENSUS BLOGS
(Sept.
12,
2017),
https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/randomsamplings/2017/09/outlying_older_ameri.html [https://perma.cc/H3LF-RRZ7].
STEVEN A. SASS, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH, HOW WORK &
81.
MARRIAGE TRENDS AFFECT SOCIAL SECURITY’S FAMILY BENEFITS 5 (2016),
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/IB_16-9.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UF5VBW7S].
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are more than twice as likely as men to be poor (27% compared to
11%).82
The higher rates for divorced and never-married women probably
reflect selection effects rather than a marriage bonus per se: nonmarital
and divorce rates are higher among groups that typically have lower
lifetime earnings and retirement incomes.83
Social Security provides benefits during retirement to qualified
workers, and the Social Security system is responsible for ensuring that
almost a third of people over age sixty-five are not poor.84 While Social
Security is available to employees who have worked for ten or more
years, individuals can claim based either on their own work record or
on that of a spouse or (with certain limitations) a former spouse; a
spouse is entitled to 50% of the amount that the other spouse would
receive, and even if a spouse’s own benefits are less than that amount,
they will be “topped up.”85
82.
See I-Fen Lin, Susan L. Brown & Anna M. Hammersmith, Marital
Biography, Social Security, and Poverty, 39 RES. ON AGING 86, 98 (2016). Jocelyn
Elise Crowley labels these consequences the gray divorce penalty. JOCELYN ELISE
CROWLEY, GRAY DIVORCE: WHAT WE LOSE AND GAIN FROM MID-LIFE SPLITS 17
(2018). She notes that women face financial penalties because of their childrearing
responsibilities and workforce patterns; men experience a “social” penalty because they
have less robust social support. Id.
83.
See generally JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW
INEQUALITY IS REMAKING THE AMERICAN FAMILY (2014) (reporting on the class
divergence in marriage rates).
84.
Kathleen Romig, Social Security Lifts More Americans Above Poverty
than Any Other Program, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES (Nov. 5, 2018),
https://www.cbpp.org/research/social-security/social-security-keeps-22-millionamericans-out-of-poverty-a-state-by-state
[https://perma.cc/G5G4-4HXS];
Teresa
Ghilarducci, Bridget Fisher & Zachary Knauss, Now is the Time to Add Retirement
Accounts to Social Security: The Guaranteed Retirement Account Proposal, SCHWARTZ
CTR.
FOR
ECON.
POL’Y
ANALYSIS,
at
4
(June
2015),
http://www.economicpolicyresearch.org/images/docs/retirement_security_background/
GRA_3.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MGY-SPG7].
85.
Indeed, if one spouse is the primary or sole wage earner, the other spouse
can receive Social Security even though that spouse has not paid into the system. lines.
See SASS, supra note 81, at 2 (“Spousal benefits guarantee the wife a Primary Insurance
Amount (PIA) [] equal to half her husband’s PIA. . . . If a woman is eligible for a
worker benefit based on her own earnings history that exceeds the spousal [] benefit,
she will receive the larger amount. If her worker benefit is lower, then she is ‘topped
up’ to the level of the spousal or survivor benefit”). With increasing divorce and nevermarried rates, however, the number of people able to claim on their spouse’s earnings
is decreasing, particularly for nonwhite populations. See Tom Anderson, Married
Couples Have 81 Ways to Claim Social Security. Here’s How to Maximize Your
Benefits, CNBC (June 4, 2017, 11:01 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/06/02/howmarried-couples-can-maximize-their-social-security-benefits.html
[https://perma.cc/KV5W-GS9R]; SOC. SEC. ADMIN., MARRIAGE TRENDS AND WOMEN’S
BENEFITS:
DIFFERENCES
BY
RACE-ETHNICITY
AND
NATIVITY
(2014),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/research-summaries/marriage-trends-raceethnicity.pdf html [https://perma.cc/TA4V-4H3R].
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84% of Americans sixty-five and older receive benefits, with more
than 60% of Social Security beneficiaries receiving one-half or more of
their income through such benefits.86 Notably, 34% of all beneficiaries
receive almost all (at least 90%) of their income from Social Security.87
There are significant variations by race. Black, Hispanic, and Asian
seniors are more likely to rely on Social Security benefits as their sole
source of income, at rates of 32%, 40%, and 26% (respectively), while
for whites, it is 18%.88 Marital status also has an impact: about 48% of
married couples, and 71% of unmarried individuals, receive one-half or
more of their income from SSA.89 Disability and sexual orientation also
create significant disparities. With changes in retirement plans, longer
lifespans and higher costs for health care, “these high rates of reliance
on Social Security benefits are not surprising.”90 Nor is the rise in
household debt and grey bankruptcy unexpected91—the high reliance on
Social Security also indicates the comparative lack of wealth among
these groups.
3. WOMEN AND WEALTH
The numbers on women and wealth are more difficult to collect,
with differing estimates depending on the age group (and source).
Globally, women hold 30% of private wealth, and constitute 10% of
the wealthiest individuals.92 By 2020, they are expected to hold $72
trillion, or 32% of the total.93 One report on women in the United

86.
SOC. SEC. ADMIN., FAST FACTS & FIGURES ABOUT SOCIAL SECURITY,
2017
at
8
(2017),
https://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/chartbooks/fast_facts/2017/fast_facts17.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9PM2-HVSU].
87.
Id. at 8.
88.
See Social Security and People of Color, NAT’L ACAD. SOC. INS.,
https://www.nasi.org/learn/socialsecurity/people-of-color
[https://perma.cc/2YR2AYP6] (reporting on 2014 data).
89.
See SOC. SEC. ADMIN., supra note 86, at 7.
90.
Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Social Security Retirement
Benefits: A Timing Model for Working Families 14 NAELA 1, 2 (2018).
91.
Deborah Thorne, Pamela Foohey, Robert M. Lawless & Katherine M.
Porter, Graying of U.S. Bankruptcy: Fallout from Life in a Risk Society 11 (Indiana
Legal
Studies
Res.
Paper
No.
406,
2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3226574 (finding an almost a
five-fold increase over the past 25 years).
92.
Women’s Wealth Is Rising, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/03/08/womens-wealth-is-rising
[https://perma.cc/VF8C-Y4QU].
93.
Investment by Women, and in Them, Is Growing, ECONOMIST (Mar. 8,
2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/03/08/investment-bywomen-and-in-them-is-growing [https://perma.cc/ZA2U-RNTK].
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States estimates that women own 51% of American private wealth.94 By
contrast, another report estimates that women control approximately
one-fifth of US wealth.95 Nonetheless, based on census household
values, women age sixty-five and over who are heads of households
have a higher net worth than male householders.96 Moreover, because
women are statistically more likely to live longer than men and men are
likely to earn more than women, widows may accumulate more money
when their spouses die. Of course, this statistic must be tempered by
the recognition that these widows are also likely to incur health care
costs and their wealth may take the form of trusts to which they have
relatively limited access.
C. Wealth Has an Impact on Children97
Stanford economist Raj Chetty, a leading expert on social
mobility, found that millennials born in the 1980s are less likely than
their parents were to out-earn their parents.98 For black and Native
94.
BMO WEALTH INST., FINANCIAL CONCERNS OF WOMEN 2 (2015),
https://www.bmo.com/privatebank/pdf/Q1-2015-Wealth-Institute-Report-FinancialConcerns-of-Women.pdf [https://perma.cc/N5E7-D4NE].
95.
Reshma Kapadia, The Stubborn Wealth Gap Between Men and Women,
BARRON’S (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-stubborn-wealth-gapbetween-men-and-women-1524099601
[https://perma.cc/9FTH-PE4P]
(finding
household net worth in the U.S. in 2017 “was almost $100 trillion in the fourth quarter
of 2017, according to the Federal Reserve” and that “[b]y 2020, women are expected to
control $22 trillion of it”).
96.
Wealth, Asset Ownership, & Debt of Households Detailed Tables: 2013,
CENSUS
BUREAU
(Sept.
17,
2018),
U.S.
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2013/demo/wealth/wealth-asset-ownership.html
[https://perma.cc/UM5U-2CR6].
97.
Probability of Children’s Income Level, Given Parents’ Income Level,
THE
HAMILTON
PROJECT
(July
18,
2013),
http://www.hamiltonproject.org/charts/probability_of_childrens_income_level_given_p
arents_income_level [https://perma.cc/C7KQ-ZWRK].
98.
Jim Tankersley, American Dream Collapsing for Young Adults, Study
Says, as Odds Plunge that Children Will Earn More than Their Parents, WASH. POST
(Dec.
8,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/08/american-dreamcollapsing-for-young-americans-study-says-finding-plunging-odds-that-children-earnmore-than-their-parents/?utm_term=.4a45fa997891
[https://perma.cc/M5C9-9T6F].
For further information on changes and trends in social mobility, see the following:
JONATHAN VESPA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE CHANGING ECONOMICS AND
DEMOGRAPHICS
OF
YOUNG
ADULTHOOD:
1975–2016
(2017),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2017/demo/p20579.pdf [https://perma.cc/BR2L-2XNR]; New Census Bureau Statistics Show How
Young Adults Today Compare with Previous Generations in Neighborhoods Nationwide,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/2014/cb14-219.html [https://perma.cc/DE8M-LZ4P]; RAJ CHETTY ET AL., THE
OPPORTUNITY ATLAS: MAPPING THE CHILDHOOD ROOTS OF SOCIAL MOBILITY,
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American children, downward mobility is even bleaker: a black child
born to parents in the top quintile is roughly as likely to fall to the
bottom family income quintile as to remain in the top quintile, while,
by contrast, a white child born in that same quintile is almost five times
as likely to stay there as fall to the bottom one.99
As critical race theorists have argued, the intergenerational
transmission of wealth is “integral to the future perpetuation of racial
inequality across generations” in a number of ways: 1) “education,
experiences, friendships, and contacts,” including college tuition; 2)
lifetime support, such as qualifying for a first home; and 3) gifting and
inheriting assets.100 Moreover, the initial disadvantages of inheritance
under slavery “became embedded in social institutions and transmitted
across generations.”101
Financial assets are important to maintaining intergenerational
wealth (although plenty of self-made billionaires exist) both because of
the transmission of actual property102 and also because of the
transmission of advantage.103 There is ample data to support the
importance of such legacies. Intergenerational transfers (whether
through gift or bequest) accounts “for at least 50%—and perhaps more
OPPORTUNITY
INSIGHTS
(2018),
https://opportunityinsights.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/atlas_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TL3-L752]; Richard Fry,
Ruth Igielnik & Eileen Patten, How Millennials Today Compare with Their
Grandparents 50 Years Ago, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 16, 2018),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/03/16/how-millennials-compare-with-theirgrandparents/ [https://perma.cc/7MUG-NU22].
99.
RAJ CHETTY ET AL., RACE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY IN THE UNITED
STATES: AN INTERGENERATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (2018), http://www.equality-ofopportunity.org/assets/documents/race_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZNY-GPZX].
100.
R. Richard Banks, “Nondiscriminatory” Perpetuation of Racial
Subordination Black Wealth/White Wealth, 76 B.U. L. REV. 669, 685–86 (1996) (book
review).
101. Patricia Hill Collins, African-American Women and Economic Justice: A
Preliminary Analysis of Wealth, Family, and African-American Social Class, 65 U.
CIN. L. REV. 825 (1997).
102.
See, e.g., PIKETTY, supra note 11, at 22, 246 (discussing the impact of
inherited wealth).
103.
See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family
Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 730 (1988) (“A central thesis of this
article is that paying for education has become the characteristic mode of
intergenerational wealth transmission for most American families.”); Mark L. Ascher,
Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 90 (1990) (proposing “a system that
allows (or even encourages) parents to use their material advantages to benefit their
children through acculturation and education yet prohibits transfers of purely financial
advantage”); Joshua C. Tate, Caregiving and the Case for Testamentary Freedom, 42
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 129, 193 (2008) (exploring basis for testamentary freedom of
disinheriting children); see also Daniel J. Amato, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly:
The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual Trusts, 86 S. CAL.
L. REV. 637, 672 (2013) (“[E]state taxation creates significant inefficiencies by
distorting economic decisionmaking.”).
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than 80%—of the net worth of families in the United States.”104
Research on inter-generational mobility shows that parental income has
an impact on both wealth and income.105 Household income is closely
related to college attendance106 and graduation,107 and those “born to
wealth” are much more likely to have college (or an advanced degree)
and to work in a family business, another way of concentrating
wealth.108
While transfers of $1,000,000 or more constitute only about 2% of
the actual number of transfers at death, they account for 40% of the
total dollars transferred, and while over 70% of inter vivos gifts are less
than $50,000, the relatively few gifts in amounts exceeding $1,000,000
account for almost half of the total dollars received.109 The median net
worth of those gift and inheritance recipients is almost three times that
of the median net worth of the population.110
As the Federal Reserve Board’s website acerbically notes, “the
bulk of intergenerational transfers are flowing to families that already
have substantial resources,” with the top 10% of households (by
income) receiving more than one-third of intergenerational transfers (as

104.
Aloni, supra note 8, at 26; see Osamudia R. James, Valuing Identity, 102
MINN. L. REV. 127, 159 (2017) (finding that the U.S. economy has failed “to support
economic security and stability through any means other than intergenerational wealth
transfer”).
105.
E.g., Ray Boshara, Born on 3rd Base? The Effects of Head Starts and
College on Family Wealth, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Apr. 17, 2018),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/born-third-base-effect-headstarts-college-family-wealth [https://perma.cc/LS8J-P7FF] (“[T]he typical middle-aged
families with the most ‘favorable’ inherited traits—white and college-educated parents—
had three times as much income and six times as much wealth compared with the
median family in the entire population.”).
106.
Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of Opportunity?: The Geography of
Intergenerational Mobility in the United States (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 19843, 2014), https://www.nber.org/papers/w19843.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB44-AP7F]; Richard V. Reeves & Eleanor Krause, Raj Chetty in 14
Charts: Big Findings on Opportunity and Mobility We Should All Know, BROOKINGS
INST.
(Jan.
11,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/social-mobilitymemos/2018/01/11/raj-chetty-in-14-charts-big-findings-on-opportunity-and-mobilitywe-should-know/ [https://perma.cc/W7Y5-CE7Z].
107.
V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Role of Parental Wealth and Income in
Financing Children’s College Attendance and Its Consequences (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 25144, 2018), https://www.nber.org/papers/w25144.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7QWV-BXW9].
108.
Laura Feiveson & John Sabelhaus, How Does Intergenerational Wealth
Transmission Affect Wealth Concentration?, FED. RES. BD. (June 1, 2018),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerationalwealth-transmission-affect-wealth-concentration-20180601.htm
[https://perma.cc/ZK6K-4JCF].
109.
Id.
110.
Id.
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shown below), and the top 10% (by wealth) receiving more than
50%.111
Table 1. Concentration of Intergeneration Transfers Received by
Income and Wealth112

Bottom Half
50th to 90th Percentiles
Top 10 Percent

Income by Income Group
21%
41%
38%

Wealth by Income Group
8%
36%
56%

Wealth begets more wealth. Consider that when someone has poor
credit (a low, or no, credit score), this can impact both employment
and housing options and also result in decreased access to various
financial products and the highest rates for borrowing money.113
D. Using the Preferences of the Wealthy?
The statistics on who has wills are not surprising: those with
higher incomes, those who are white, and those who are older.114
Examining the dispositions of wills provides insight into how those
demographics—older, wealthier, whites—seek to dispose of their
property. But those preferences may be skewed by that demographic.
In our admittedly small empirical study, in which we found little
planning, we observed that the utility of wills depended not necessarily
on wealth but instead on family structure and relationship. That is,
families who got along sometimes ignored the decedent’s wishes and
distributed property as they deemed fair.115 That type of informal
distribution may be what happens in the overwhelming majority of
deaths that never make it to probate court. For example, of the more
than 9000 deaths in 2016 in Pima County, Arizona (which includes

111.
Id.
112.
How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth
RES.
BD.,
Concentration?
Accessible
Data,
FED.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerationalwealth-transmission-affect-wealth-concentration-accessible-20180601.htm#fig520180601 [https://perma.cc/NGH2-ZL5Z].
113. DIANA ELLIOTT & RICKI GRANETZ LOWITZ, URBAN INST., WHAT IS THE
COST
OF
POOR
CREDIT?
(2018),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/99021/what_is_the_cost_of_poor_
credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/QDP5-8LY6].
114.
Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Do Not Have a Will, GALLUP (May
18,
2016),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/191651/majority-not.aspx
[https://perma.cc/LZG7-S4GQ].
115.
Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 344–48.
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Tucson), less than 1% resulted in a probate filing.116 Part of this
critique of the celebration of dead hand control, then, is not only that it
gives control to the dead that the decedent may not necessarily have
wanted (in light of the number of people who do not write wills), but
also that it may be ignored by the survivors when it is contrary to their
needs (particularly given the huge percentage of estates that stay out of
probate court).
III. MOVING FORWARD
Asking the wealth question shows the impact of numerous trusts
and estates doctrines on: (1) people of varying socioeconomic levels;
(2) the need to adapt doctrine to address actual, rather than presumed,
preferences; and (3) the benefits of drawing on alternative perspectives
and experiences. This perspective shows us that decreasing economic
inequality in America will require a series of large-scale policies. Some
of them are familiar to trusts and estates scholars, such as increasing
the marginal tax rate117 and the estate and gift tax,118 or changing
various doctrines.119 Others come from outside of the field, as discussed
at the end of this Essay.120
I want to show how the wealth question applies in two contexts:
wills for everyone and intestacy. Consider the underlying assumptions
of each: does everyone really need a will, or should we work on
improving the intestacy system? And do the intestacy rules reflect the

116.
Fleming & Curti, Take Our Survey (Mar. 3, 2019),
https://perma.cc/3C8G-HKHB.
117.
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, The Economics of Soaking the Rich, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan 5, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/opinion/alexandria-ocasiocortez-tax-policy-dance.html [https://perma.cc/QV6S-4UM8]. In 1980, the top federal
income tax rate was 70%. See Federal Income Tax Brackets (Tax Year 1979),
https://www.tax-brackets.org/federaltaxtable/1980
TAXBRACKETS.ORG,
[https://perma.cc/VK29-PGAA].
118.
See, e.g., Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code:
Using the Estate Tax to Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L.
REV. 1255, 1256 (2013).
119.
These doctrines include:
(1) rules that interact with the tax-and-transfer system (e.g., the rule against
perpetuities), (2) rules that govern relations between grantors and
beneficiaries on the one hand and creditors on the other (e.g., spendthrift
and asset protection trusts), (3) rules that govern relations between
beneficiaries and trustees (e.g., fiduciary duties), and (4) rules that govern
relations among beneficiaries (e.g., abatement, ademption, cy pres, and
execution formalities).
Chang, supra note 10, at 77.
120.
See infra text at notes 137–38.
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preferences of the decedents who do not write wills? And then, this
Part turns to solutions outside of the field.
A. Trusts and Estates and the Wealth Question
1. WILLS FOR ALL
There are numerous reasons to have a will,121 with the top reason
most frequently consisting of some variation of testator control. But
consider whether everyone needs to engage in such planning. Because
outsider perspectives have caused us to see trusts and estates as not just
focused on testator’s intent, but also on the structure of wealth and the
meaning of inheritance to different groups of people, wills may not be
useful for individuals who would choose the intestacy result122—or who
prefer that surviving family members make decisions with relatively
minimal guidance.123 Wills that enshrine dead hand control assume that
the testator has some preference to express, some favored disposition
that needs to be reinforced by a probate court. As a thought
experiment, conjecture whether a decedent inevitably and always cares
about asset disposition, or would want the survivors to do what they
think is best, or might want to preserve family harmony by not making
any such decisions.124 Studies of actual practices for estates that stay out
of court, or are resolved without court challenge, may show the merely
“precatory” nature of the testator’s preferences.125 The cases that do
appear in court represent a tiny percentage of the population that dies
each year.126
While wills for everyone may not be an appropriate slogan,
incapacity planning for everyone (somewhat clunkier) might be more
appropriate. Adapting the initiatives in the wills context to ensure that
individuals plan for their own capacity might be more helpful to ensure
that wishes with respect to health care and financial planning are
implemented.

121.
See, e.g., Top Ten Reasons to Have a Will, FINDLAW,
https://estate.findlaw.com/wills/top-ten-reasons-to-have-a-will.html
[https://perma.cc/7WS4-AZWF].
122.
Horton, supra note 55, at 341 (“[A] critic might question the decision to
draw inferences about intestacy from dispositive choices in wills.”).
123.
For those who plan, a power of appointment performs this function by
deferring decisionmaking to a trusted powerholder as do discretionary distribution
trusts.
124. This critique of dead hand control thus asks the wealth question by
drawing on actual experiences and preferences. See supra note 9.
125.
Executors do have fiduciary responsibilities, of course. But only estates
that go through probate court have such fiduciaries appointed.
126.
See supra note 116 (discussing Pima County, Arizona).
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2. INTESTACY RULES

The intestacy rules are premised on the normative nuclear family,
and they reflect the desires of many of those families.127 The UPC has
steadfastly focused on marital relationships, not broadening provisions
concerning intestacy, for example, to include civil unions or domestic
partners.128 But the trends in nonmarriage, divorce, and short-term
cohabitating unions have led to a wide assortment of stepfamilies and
kin networks.129
Some aspects of the intestacy laws reflect these changes, such as
the share left to a surviving spouse when either the decedent or the
survivor have non-joint children, with the surviving spouse in such
situations receiving a smaller share than where there are only joint
children.130 But other parts of the intestacy laws have not been revised
to reflect these new family structures. While this may be entirely
appropriate—many nonmarital partners, for example, may not want
their assets distributed to the other partner upon death through
intestacy131—it may not reflect the realities of functional families. In
their study, for example, Danaya Wright and Beth Sterner found that a
majority of decedents who had stepchildren left property to them.132
***
Applying a wealth lens would result in challenges to other
doctrines. Consider revocation upon divorce statutes, which serve a
function in protecting allegedly forgetful testators. Yet such a doctrine
protects only a certain part of the population, and is not useful for lowincome people who are not married and may have no revocablebeneficiary assets,133 thereby showing how the wealth lens affects the
analysis.

127.
See, e.g., Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 2, at 337–38 (small sample);
Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner, Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An
Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341
(2017).
128.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II (amended 2010).
129.
See PAUL TAYLOR, THE NEXT AMERICA: BOOMERS, MILLENNIALS, AND
THE LOOMING GENERATIONAL SHOWDOWN (2014); CARBONE & CAHN, supra note 83.
130.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II; see also SUSAN N. GARY, JEROME
BORISON, NAOMI R. CAHN & PAULA A. MONOPOLI, CONTEMPORARY TRUSTS AND
ESTATES chs. 2–3 (3d ed. 2017) (discussing family inheritance rights).
131.
See, e.g., June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV.
55 (2017).
132.
See Wright & Sterner, supra note 127, at 368.
133.
See Naomi R. Cahn, Revisiting Revocation Upon Divorce?, 103 IOWA L.
REV. 1879, 1901 (2018).
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B. Other Policies
While trusts and estates law contributes to the intergenerational
transmission of wealth (and corresponding inequality), the
intergenerational transmission of wealth is not the sole culprit—or
source—of challenging economic inequality.134 Consequently, it is
useful to place reforms from within trusts and estates into a larger
context that addresses wealth accumulation.135 Such approaches might
include: 1) labor market policies that would contribute to a full
employment economy; 2) universal access to health insurance; 3) free
early childhood education and greater availability to subsidized, high
quality child care, which could open up opportunities for children and
their parents; 4) greater opportunities for retraining or returns to
school, perhaps through community colleges, to give workers greater
flexibility and resilience; and 5) a minimum income should be
considered to provide any hope of greater individual and family
security.136
But the core is still wealth, and the existence of increasing
economic inequality is at least partially the result of intergenerational
wealth transmission; that process of wealth transmission provides the
context for much of our scholarship in this field. Yet it also means that
we must be attentive to just “[h]ow well any area of law safeguards the
historically disadvantaged,”137 including trusts and estates. Building on
that core insight, we must also be attentive to just how any area of law
reflects societal prejudices and, more fundamentally, how difficult it is
to change that area without changing the surrounding context.

134.
See George-Levi Gayle & Andrés Hincapié, Which Persists More from
Generation to Generation—Income or Wealth?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (July
2016),
https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/july-2016/whichpersists-more-from-generation-to-generation-income-or-wealth#5
[https://perma.cc/FZP4-MRYD] (“[P]olicies aimed at human capital enhancement,
e.g., free preschool for everyone, may be as effective at combating inequality as those
aimed at limiting the advantage of the wealthy, e.g., a policy of a high inheritance
tax.”). But see Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 108 (“[P]olicies that tax and
redistribute intergenerational transfers have the potential to greatly shift wealth around
the population.”).
135.
Of course, if more people earn more, then there is more work for the
trusts and estates field.
136.
See NAOMI CAHN & JUNE CARBONE, RED FAMILIES V. BLUE FAMILIES
190–205 (2010); QUART, supra note 20, at 239–41; LOWREY, supra note 20; see also
Dixon & Suk, supra note 20 (noting that “many constitutional democracies . . . are
actively considering, and passing, measures to increase investments in education and
training, raise the minimum wage, [and] guarantee a universal basic income”).
137.
Crawford & Infanti, supra note 13, at 347.

